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mcp-memory D

54/100 · 5 findings (0 critical) · scope broad · Ranked #38 of 53 scanned.

Scanned 2026-09-09 · engine v0.1.0 (8 regex rules, OWASP-mapped) · upstream modelcontextprotocol/servers @ d73f99e (2026-09-02)

Score breakdown

Score constrained by 0 critical and 5 high-severity findings.

Fix first (5 critical/high)

Severity	Rule	Finding	Remediation
HIGH	AT-SEC-005 (ASI02)	Unrestricted Recursive File Deletion / Modification __tests__/delete-reporting.test.ts:35 Evidence: await fs.unlink(testFilePath);	Enforce strict jail/root directories and require explicit human-in-the-loop confirmation before file deletions.
HIGH	AT-SEC-005 (ASI02)	Unrestricted Recursive File Deletion / Modification __tests__/file-path.test.ts:32 Evidence: await fs.unlink(oldMemoryPath);	Enforce strict jail/root directories and require explicit human-in-the-loop confirmation before file deletions.
HIGH	AT-SEC-005 (ASI02)	Unrestricted Recursive File Deletion / Modification __tests__/file-path.test.ts:37 Evidence: await fs.unlink(newMemoryPath);	Enforce strict jail/root directories and require explicit human-in-the-loop confirmation before file deletions.
HIGH	AT-SEC-005 (ASI02)	Unrestricted Recursive File Deletion / Modification __tests__/knowledge-graph.test.ts:23 Evidence: await fs.unlink(testFilePath);	Enforce strict jail/root directories and require explicit human-in-the-loop confirmation before file deletions.
HIGH	AT-SEC-005 (ASI02)	Unrestricted Recursive File Deletion / Modification index.ts:197 Evidence: await fs.unlink(tempFilePath).catch(() => {});	Enforce strict jail/root directories and require explicit human-in-the-loop confirmation before file deletions.

Permissions

Scope: broad · Shell: disabled · Network egress: no · File deletion: enabled · Human approval: none

Provenance

License: SEE LICENSE IN LICENSE · Lockfile: no · Security policy: no · Signals: unverified origin