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Trust Card · Static snapshot

examples/vulnerable-mcp-server F

33/100 · 5 findings (3 critical) · scope excessive · Ranked #53 of 53 scanned.

Scanned 2026-09-09 · engine v0.1.0 (8 regex rules, OWASP-mapped) · upstream eulogik/AgentTrust @ ca597b8 (2026-09-09)

Score breakdown

Score constrained by 3 critical and 1 high-severity findings.

Fix first (4 critical/high)

Severity	Rule	Finding	Remediation
CRITICAL	AT-SEC-001 (LLM01)	Direct Prompt Concatenation (Injection Vulnerability) server.ts:24 Evidence: const systemPrompt = "You are an assistant. " + args.userInput;	Use parameterized messages, structured schema validation (Zod), and clear boundary delimiters.
CRITICAL	AT-SEC-002 (LLM02)	Hardcoded Credential or API Secret server.ts:11 Evidence: const API_SECRET_TOKEN = "sk-proj-abc123456789012345678901234567890";	Move credentials to secure environment variables or a key vault. Never commit API keys.
CRITICAL	AT-SEC-003 (ASI02)	Unbounded Dynamic Shell Execution server.ts:16 Evidence: exec(args.cmd, (err, stdout) => {	Strictly restrict shell execution to an immutable allowlist of binary commands with explicit argument arrays, or execute inside microVM sandboxes.
HIGH	AT-SEC-005 (ASI02)	Unrestricted Recursive File Deletion / Modification server.ts:31 Evidence: fs.unlinkSync("/data/users/" + args.userId);	Enforce strict jail/root directories and require explicit human-in-the-loop confirmation before file deletions.
MEDIUM	AT-SEC-007 (LLM02)	Raw Secret Leakage in Debug Logging server.ts:25 Evidence: console.log("Debug logging token: " + API_SECRET_TOKEN); // VULNERABILITY 4: Secret leakage (AT-SEC-007)	Implement PII/secret redaction masks before writing to log streams.

Permissions

Scope: excessive · Shell: enabled · Network egress: no · File deletion: enabled · Human approval: none

Provenance

License: none detected · Lockfile: no · Security policy: no · Signals: unverified origin